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Standard of Review
This Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
and make all factual inferences in favor of plaintiffs, in considering the
City’s motion for summary judgment.
Maddow
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 107 F.3d 846, 851 (11th
Cir. 1997)
.
Where, as here, discriminatory intent is at issue in a Fair Housing claim, the
general summary judgment standard should be “applied with rigor.”
Marthon v. Maple Grove Condo. Ass’n., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1042(N.D. Ill. 2000)
.
See Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 832 (2d Cir. 1994)
(in
Fair Housing Act cases, it is fact-finder’s province to determine true reasons
for adverse action when defendant proffers justification that may camouflage
animus).
Thus, this court
reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Wise
Enterprises, Inc. v. Unified Govt’t of Athens-Clarke County, 217 F.3d
1360, 1362 (11th Cir.2000)
.
Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P 56(c). A
court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., --- U.S. ---, 120 S.Ct.2097, 2110, 147
L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), discussing standard for granting judgment as a matter
of law under Fed.R.Civ.P.50, which is the “same” as the standard for
granting summary judgment under Rule 56). “[T]he court should give credence to
the ‘evidence favoring the non-movant as well as that evidence supporting the
moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.’” Id. (citations
omitted). In other words, we must consider the entire record, but “disregard
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
believe.” Id. at 2102.
Finally, the “district court’s conclusion[s] of law [are] subject to
complete and independent review by this court.” In re Sure-Snap Corp.,
983 F.2d 1015, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993)
.
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